Russia's Digital Gulag: Those Responsible



ANTI-CORRUPTION FOUNDATION

Here is a list of politicians, officials, organisations and their CEOs who are responsible for bringing the Russian internet under state control. Through their efforts, the confidentiality of communications has been destroyed, and users' data are now routinely accessible to the security services. They cut off citizens from uncensored information and even shut down internet access across entire regions for political reasons. It is these individuals and entities that are developing state-owned digital platforms designed to monitor users' activities and the content they produce, whilst feeding state propaganda to a population who is deliberately denied any meaningful alternatives.

This list has been compiled by the Anti-Corruption Foundation, a Russian non-governmental organisation that has opposed Vladimir Putin's dictatorship for the past fifteen years. We understand how this authoritarian regime operates. We have watched it systematically dismantle political freedoms and silence the independent media before finally turning its attention to the internet — for many years the last remaining space beyond direct state control. That is no longer the case. Specific individuals and organisations are responsible for this transformation.

Those who have played a key role in establishing state control over the internet in Russia must face international sanctions.

In the context of the war launched by Vladimir Putin — now entering its fifth year — Russia's internet policies can no longer be regarded as merely a domestic matter or a hardship confined to its own citizens. Propaganda sustains the military effort and stifles civil society. Control over the flow of information facilitates repression by the security services and suppresses dissenting voices. The same companies and individuals who have constructed a digital Gulag within Russia are also engaged in information warfare against Europe, the United States and other countries.

The list focuses on those who typically escape public scrutiny yet are indispensable to the state's dominance of the Russian internet. We have noted where individuals or companies are already subject to sanctions, but believe that the scope of countries imposing such measures should be significantly widened. For each entry, we provide a description of their role, drawn from open sources including media reports and the organisations' own websites.

Architects of State Control Over the Internet

№	Person / Company	Description
1	**Matveeva Tatyana Vladimirovna** Матвеева Татьяна Владимировна 4 January 1976 Female	Tatyana Matveeva is Head of the Department of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. She sits on the Interdepartmental working group on digital economy ecosystems and platforms, and contributes to strategic planning documents and legislative acts. She plays a central role in shaping state policy on digital infrastructure and national information security, a position that stems from her formal duties and the Presidential Administration's status as the body that defines and enforces national policy through Vladimir Putin's effectively unlimited authority. The policy developed under her leadership has led to the creation of a state-controlled national segment of the global internet, with severe restrictions on citizens' access to foreign resources and services. Infrastructure has been built to manage and, if required, isolate the Russian segment from the global internet and control major traffic flows. Censorship and content filtering have been strengthened, personal data have undergone forced localization and effective nationalization to guarantee unrestricted state access, and a state-controlled digital environment is being created for Russian users through blocks on foreign services and the promotion of supervised domestic alternatives. Since taking up the post on 28 March 2020, Matveeva has overseen—particularly in the context of the war in Ukraine—the shift from intensive state regulation of the internet to a model of a managed national information space, where security, sovereignty, and state control take absolute priority over openness, competition, and global connectivity.
2	**Institute for Internet Development Autonomous Non-Profit Organization** Автономная некоммерческая организация «Институт развития Интернета» TIN: 7709473987 Entity Sanctioned by: CA, EU, AU	A non-profit organization that, since mid-2022, has effectively functioned as the central production and distribution hub for state propaganda and ideological content within the Russian segment of the internet. The organization operates in close coordination with the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation and its First Deputy Chief of Staff, Sergey Kiriyenko, who oversees domestic policy. The Institute for Internet Development (IID), originally established in 2015 as a platform for dialogue between the internet industry and the authorities, has gradually transformed into the primary channel for distributing budgetary funds for the production and promotion of state propaganda under the guise of "patriotic" and "socially significant" content. The majority of the organization's budget—which is projected to reach approximately 333 million USD in 2026 (based on the exchange rate at the time this list was published)—is allocated to projects that directly or indirectly align with the current state ideological agenda. These projects include the justification and glorification of Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the construction of a "besieged fortress" narrative, and the cultivation of loyalty to the authorities among young people. The activities of the IID form part of a broader state strategy aimed at redirecting Russian internet users away from foreign platforms subject to state blocking and toward a state-controlled and censored digital environment. The IID produces content for these domestic platforms that complies with the censorship and control requirements of the Russian authorities and is specifically designed to retain users within that controlled ecosystem.

№	Person / Company	Description
3	**Goreslavsky Alexey Sergeyevich** Гореславский Алексей Сергеевич 13 July 1977 Male Sanctioned by: CA, EU, AU	Russian propagandist; journalist and media manager; head of the Institute for Internet Development (IID), an organization specializing in state propaganda. Under his leadership, the IID has effectively functioned as the central production and distribution hub for state propaganda and ideological content within the Russian segment of the internet. According to journalistic investigations, the organization is one of the principal administrators of state budget funds allocated for propaganda purposes. Under Alexey Goreslavsky's leadership, the institute has evolved into a quasi-state entity with a budget projected to reach approximately 333 million USD in 2026 (based on the exchange rate at the time this list was published). The IID focuses on funding projects described as "online military-patriotic education" and on promoting the government's ideological agenda. The activities of the IID form part of a broader state strategy aimed at redirecting Russian internet users away from foreign platforms subject to state blocking and toward a state-controlled and censored digital environment. From 2017 to 2020, Alexey Goreslavsky worked in the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, where he oversaw the internet industry. Prior to that, he played a key role in the suppression of independent media in Russia. In 2014, he was appointed editor-in-chief of Lenta.ru, then a widely read independent news outlet. His appointment followed the dismissal of the previous editor-in-chief by the outlet's owner, oligarch Alexander Mamut. After this change, Lenta.ru was transformed into a semi-censored, state-aligned media outlet.
4	**Mizulina Ekaterina Mikhailovna** Мизулина Екатерина Михайловна 1 September 1984 Female Sanctioned by: CA, EU	Ekaterina Mizulina is a Russian public figure and the Chairwoman of the Safe Internet League. In this position, she enforces censorship measures against internet content creators and artists in support of the Russian government and its policies. As a public figure and member of the Public Chamber of Russia, Mizulina actively advocates for state policy aimed at strengthening government control over the internet, isolating users from foreign platforms, and restricting the free exchange of information. She supports the prohibition of tools that enable users to circumvent state-imposed blocks. Mizulina actively participates in initiatives to monitor and block content deemed harmful to society. As Chairwoman of the Safe Internet League, she initiates official complaints to Russian law enforcement agencies against internet content creators—including bloggers, as well as musicians, celebrities, and influencers—citing anti-war statements, LGBT+-related materials, and information about the war in Ukraine that does not align with the official state position. In this capacity, she operates as an independent instrument of censorship, complementing the work of state bodies responsible for censorship, such as Roskomnadzor, the General Prosecutor's Office, and others. As a result, Ekaterina Mizulina compels Russian internet content creators and artists either to remove anti-government content or to produce content that supports the Russian government and its policies.

№	Person / Company	Description
5	**Svintsov Andrey Nikolayevich** Свинцов Андрей Николаевич 12 November 1978 Male Sanctioned by: CA, EU	Deputy Chair of the State Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament) Committee on Information Policy, Information Technologies, and Communications. As a legislator and public speaker, he advocates for tighter internet restrictions and for limiting the influence of foreign platforms within the Russian internet segment by deliberately throttling services that fail to comply with Russia's repressive legislation. He also promotes the de-anonymization of users through the use of state-controlled resources. In the process of shaping state policy on control over the Russian internet segment, Andrey Svintsov probes public reaction to proposed new restrictions. This role allows the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation to develop and implement policies that are less likely to provoke significant public resistance. Andrey Svintsov's activities are aimed at strengthening censorship and restricting Russian citizens' access to information that is not subject to state control.

Administrators of State Control Over the Internet

№	Person / Company	Description
6	**Lipov Andrei Yurievich** Липов Андрей Юрьевич 23 November 1969 Male Sanctioned by: CA, EU, AU	Head of Roskomnadzor (the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media). This state agency is the primary administrator of the policy aimed at establishing control over the Russian internet segment. The agency directly, and through its subordinate organization General Radio Frequency Center FSUE, implements internet censorship and blocks resources and information in accordance with Russian repressive legislation. Roskomnadzor receives substantial financial and organizational resources from the state and employs them to improve methods of blocking and traffic control. Roskomnadzor participates in the formulation of state internet policy by the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation and in the preparation of legislative acts by the Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media. As the head of this agency, Andrey Lipov is the principal official in the Russian Federation responsible for enforcing censorship in the media and online, restricting users' access to uncensored information, and exercising political control over the infrastructure of the Russian internet segment. Prior to his appointment as head of Roskomnadzor, Andrey Lipov served from 2018 until March 2020 as Head of the Department of the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. In this role, he was responsible for shaping state policy and for promoting the adoption of the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1].
7	**Logunov Vladimir Viktorovich** Логунов Владимир Викторович 1 November 1982 Male Sanctioned by: CA, EU, AU	Deputy Head of Roskomnadzor [2]. By virtue of his official duties, Vladimir Logunov oversees key structural divisions of Roskomnadzor, including the Department of Organizational Development and Information Technologies and the Financial and Administrative Department. Under his supervision are matters related to Roskomnadzor's information infrastructure and the activities of subordinate organizations that perform technical functions for controlling the Russian internet segment and the dissemination of information within it. He also oversees the critical function of storing information transmitted in the Russian internet segment and data about users. This enables the state to identify and punish distributors of prohibited information. Vladimir Logunov actively supports the policy of "digital sovereignty", understood as full state control over the national internet segment and the dissemination of information within it, as well as the state policy restricting the placement of advertising on platforms banned in Russia, which is aimed at depriving them of revenue from Russian advertisers. From 2012 until April 2020, Vladimir Logunov worked in the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, where he held the position of Deputy Chief of the Department of the Presidential Administration for the Development of Information and Communication Technologies and Communications Infrastructure. In that role, he was responsible for shaping state policy regarding the internet, which entailed establishing control over its Russian segment and over users' exchange of information.

№	Person / Company	Description
8	**Subbotin Vadim Alekseevich** Субботин Вадим Алексеевич 29 March 1983 Male Sanctioned by: CA, EU, AU	Deputy Head of Roskomnadzor [2]. By virtue of his official responsibilities, Vadim Subbotin oversees the Department of Licensing, Control, and Supervision in the Field of Mass Communications. This department enforces censorship in the media, monitors content produced by political opponents of the regime designated as “foreign agents”, and pursues alleged “violations” through the imposition of substantial fines, criminal prosecution, and the revocation of media licenses. Subbotin is responsible for monitoring and making decisions on the blocking of foreign media within Russia. He supervises interactions with internet service providers, telecommunications operators, and other entities regarding restrictions on access to information, as well as the maintenance of the registry of resources subject to access limitations. As the official overseeing the Department of Control and Supervision in the Field of Electronic Communications, Vadim Subbotin is responsible for maintaining the registry of organizers of information dissemination. Inclusion in this registry imposes an obligation to store all user data, enabling the state to access such information at any time, identify users, and determine the content of their communications and their interlocutors. Subbotin also oversees cooperation with the General Prosecutor’s Office on extrajudicial blocking, as well as coordination with other state bodies for the purpose of implementing censorship. Vadim Subbotin publicly supports state-imposed censorship and its automation, including bans on the dissemination of information for political reasons. He has also spoken favorably about measures aimed at impeding the operation of foreign online services that fail to comply with Russian restrictions, citing the blocking of Twitter (now X) as an example. In state-controlled media, Subbotin regularly reports on the blocking of thousands of online resources by Roskomnadzor, including actions taken to suppress the free dissemination of information about Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
9	**Terliakov Oleg Aleksandrovich** Терляков Олег Александрович 5 March 1979 Male Sanctioned by: CA, EU, AU	Deputy Head of Roskomnadzor [2]. By virtue of his official duties, Oleg Terliakov oversees the Department of Control and Supervision in the Field of Communications, which ensures the technical execution of decisions to restrict access to online content and services through the deployment of specialized equipment. This equipment also provides the technical capability to violate the secrecy of communications, persecute individuals disseminating content prohibited by the state, and centrally disconnect users from the internet. Oleg Terliakov publicly expresses support for the policy of Russia’s leadership in establishing control over the technical infrastructure of the internet, enabling the management of information dissemination, including the automation of censorship. He endorses the policy of user identification and the blocking of messengers not controlled by the state, such as WhatsApp and Telegram. Terliakov emphasizes the importance of the independent operation of the Russian internet segment and prioritizes state regulation of the internet as an instrument of national security.

№	Person / Company	Description
10	**Wagner Milosh Eduardovich** Вагнер Милош Эдуардович 14 October 1979 Male Sanctioned by: CA, EU, AU	Deputy Head of Roskomnadzor [2]. By virtue of his official duties, Milosh Wagner oversees the area of personal data protection. The requirements of Russian legislation mandating that the collection, storage, and processing of personal data occur on the territory of the country have become an important instrument for reducing spaces of information exchange that are not subject to state control. Foreign services that fail to comply with these requirements are blocked, while compliance enables Russian authorities to use access to the data for the persecution of dissenters. Milosh Wagner is also responsible for improving the legal regulation in the field of Roskomnadzor's activities, including the tightening of regulation, the expansion of the agency's powers, and the increase in obligations imposed on citizens and organizations. He is further tasked with defending, on the international stage, the right of Russian authorities to regulate and enforce laws in the national internet segment without restrictions imposed by international norms.
11	**Zaveryachev Alexander Yuryevich** Заверячев Александр Юрьевич 10 June 1978 Male	Head of the Department of Organizational Development and Information Technologies of Roskomnadzor [2]. As head of one of the agency's core structural division, Alexander Zaveryachev oversees the enforcement of one of the key repressive laws in the internet domain — the Yarovaya law [3]. Alexander Zaveryachev oversees the mandatory retention of users' messages and related data by messaging apps, social networks, email services, and other platforms, enabling state access to this information. The obligation to store such data provides the state with extensive capabilities to control the dissemination of information in the Russian internet segment, to persecute dissenters, and serves as a universal ground for blocking foreign services that refuse compliance. Alexander Zaveryachev is responsible for implementing state policy to restrict the placement of advertising on platforms banned in Russia, a measure aimed at depriving them of revenue from Russian advertisers and financially strangling media targeted by the state and operating in exile. Additionally, Alexander Zaveryachev ensures the functioning of the agency's information systems that support the performance of its functions and its interaction with subordinate organizations and other state bodies — without which the effective exercise of censorship by Roskomnadzor would be impossible.
12	**Ilyina Inna Vladimirovna** Ильина Инна Владимировна 24 August 1977 Female	Head of the Financial and Administrative Department of Roskomnadzor [2]. As head of one of the agency's core structural division, Inna Ilyina is responsible for managing organizations subordinate to the state agency that perform technical functions related to censorship and control over the Russian internet segment. Under her authority falls the approval of activity programs for these enterprises, the formation of their budgets, and the determination of personnel numbers. Since Roskomnadzor focuses on exercising authoritative functions, it is precisely the subordinate organizations—particularly General Radio Frequency Center FSUE—that carry out all technical work within the agency's powers, serving as its operational "arms." They conduct monitoring of the information space to identify messages subject to censorship and resources that must be blocked. They also manage the equipment through which control over the Russian internet segment is exercised and directly implement blocking decisions. Therefore, the management of organizations subordinate to Roskomnadzor plays a pivotal role in the implementation of censorship and control over the Russian internet segment.

№	Person / Company	Description
13	**Deniskina Tatyana Valerievna** Денискина Татьяна Валерьевна 28 June 1978 Female	Head of the Department of Licensing, Control, and Supervision in the Field of Mass Communications of Roskomnadzor [2]. Tatyana Deniskina is directly responsible for enforcing censorship in the media, monitoring content produced by opposition media designated as “foreign agents”, and pursuing alleged “violations” through the imposition of substantial fines and revocation of media licenses. Her department is responsible for monitoring and decisions regarding the blocking of foreign media on Russian territory. A journalistic investigation based on internal correspondence of the organization subordinate to Roskomnadzor, General Radio Frequency Center FSUE, reveals that Tatyana Deniskina directly issues instructions for content monitoring to implement censorship. Her public statements demonstrate that she supports censorship based on ideological grounds.
14	**Zaitsev Evgeny Yuryevich** Зайцев Евгений Юрьевич 16 September 1983 Male	Head of the Department of Control and Supervision in the Field of Electronic Communications of Roskomnadzor [2]. Under Evgeny Zaitsev’s authority falls interaction with providers, telecommunications operators, and other entities concerning restrictions on access to information, as well as the maintenance of the registry of restricted access resources. He is also responsible for maintaining the registry of information dissemination organizers, inclusion in which obliges platforms to retain all user data, allowing the state to access it at any time, identify users, and determine what information was exchanged and with whom. Evgeny Zaitsev’s department interacts with the General Prosecutor’s Office on issues of extrajudicial blocking and cooperates with other state bodies for the purpose of implementing censorship. Evgeny Zaitsev publicly supports the exercise of censorship, including bans on the dissemination of information about the war in Ukraine and protests against the policies of the Russian authorities.
15	**Prytkin Maxim Alexandrovich** Прыткин Максим Александрович 16 March 1978 Male	Head of the Department for Supervision in the Field of Communications of Roskomnadzor [2]. Maxim Prytkin heads the division responsible for the technical implementation of blocking measures, censorship, and control over the dissemination of information. Under his authority falls the installation of technical control equipment and the execution of measures for the direct restriction of access to internet resources. Maxim Prytkin oversees the deployment of technical means for countering threats (TSPU) to mobile operators—equipment that enables centralized control of internet traffic and the blocking of access to resources listed in the Roskomnadzor registry through deep traffic inspection and filtering. He also ensures that TSPU are installed by all mobile communications operators. He is responsible for overseeing the installation of the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) by telecommunications operators, enabling online surveillance of citizens and facilitating direct access for security services.

№	Person / Company	Description
16	**Kontemirov Yury Evgenyevich** Контемиров Юрий Евгеньевич 5 July 1980 Male	Head of the Department for the Protection of the Rights of Personal Data Subjects of Roskomnadzor [2]. Yury Kontemirov is responsible for enforcing the requirements of Russian legislation stipulating that the collection, storage, and processing of personal data of Russian users must take place on Russian territory. These requirements serve as a key instrument of pressure used by the Russian authorities to compel foreign services to cooperate. Compliance with this requirement enables Russian state bodies to obtain full access to information for the purposes of political persecution. Refusal to comply with this requirement provides grounds for blocking foreign services on Russian territory, thereby reducing spaces of information exchange that are not subject to state control.
17	**Smelyanskaya Maria Yuryevna** Смелянская Мария Юрьевна 9 September 1986 Female	Head of the Department of Legal Support, International and General Interaction of Roskomnadzor [2]. Maria Smelyanskaya is responsible for improving the legal regulation in Roskomnadzor's activities, including the tightening of regulation, the expansion of the agency's powers, and the increase in obligations imposed on citizens and organizations. She is also responsible for defending, on the international stage, the Russian authorities' claimed right to regulate and enforce laws in Russia's national internet without regard for international norms.

Technical Implementation of State Internet Policy

№	Person / Company	Description
18	**General Radio Frequency Center Federal State Unitary Enterprise (GRFC FSUE)** Федеральное государственное унитарное предприятие «Главный Радиочастотный Центр» (ФГУП «ГРЧЦ») TIN: 7706228218 Entity Sanctioned by: EU	The GRFC is the primary subordinate organization of the Russian state agency responsible for censorship and control over the information space — Roskomnadzor. The GRFC is state-owned, reports directly to Roskomnadzor and functions as its operational arm, carrying out all technical activities within the agency's authority. It monitors the information space to identify content subject to censorship and resources slated for restriction, manages the technical infrastructure used to control the Russian internet, and directly enforces access restrictions. The GRFC additionally acts as an intermediary between Roskomnadzor and private companies in matters of procuring equipment and software, as well as conducting research. The organization has served as the contracting authority for procurements totaling 464 million USD. It is a large organization with more than 5,000 employees. Its staff has grown since the beginning of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, in parallel with intensified censorship, an increased number of access restrictions, and expanded state powers to interfere in the functioning of the Russian internet.
19	**Temny Sergey Vladimirovich** Тёмный Сергей Владимирович 21 July 1983 Male	Acting Head of the General Radio Frequency Center — a state-owned company subordinate to Roskomnadzor [2] and carries out all technical work necessary for the state authority to exercise its powers. The GRFC is owned by the state, reports directly to Roskomnadzor, and serves as its operational arm. It conducts monitoring of the information space to identify messages subject to censorship and resources that must be blocked. It also manages the equipment through which control over the Russian internet is exercised and directly implements access restrictions. In his position, Sergey Temny plays a key role in enabling Russian authorities to effectively implement censorship and control over the information space, including the Russian internet segment. Sergey Temny holds the status of acting head, as did all previous heads of the organization, indicating that the designation of the position as temporary is purely nominal.

№	Person / Company	Description
20	**Khutortsev Sergey Sergeevich** Хуторцев Сергей Сергеевич 21 May 1980 Male	Director of the Center for Monitoring and Management of Public Communications Networks (CMMPCN), a subdivision of the General Radio Frequency Center. The GRFC is the primary subordinate organization of the Russian state agency responsible for censorship and control over the information space — Roskomnadzor. The GRFC is state-owned, reports directly to Roskomnadzor, carries out all technical activities within the agency's authority, and serves as its operational arm. The CMMPCN was established to exercise the powers granted to the state following the adoption of the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1]. The CMMPCN oversees the operation of state-installed technical equipment at internet service providers. This technical equipment for countering threats (TSPU) is designed to block access to resources as decided by Roskomnadzor through deep filtering of internet traffic. As a result, both the practice of blocking and the actual number of blocked resources remain beyond effective oversight. Sergey Khutortsev, who previously served in the Federal Protective Service (FSO), in his current position directs the technical blocking of prohibited websites and can assume centralized management of the Russian internet segment in the event of threats to its security, as defined by the Russian authorities.
21	**RT LABS JSC** Акционерное общество «РТ ЛАБС» (АО «РТ ЛАБС») TIN: 5047053920 Entity	A subsidiary of Rostelecom PJSC, whose primary tasks include systems integration and the full-cycle execution of complex infrastructure projects, including those in the interests of state bodies. Rostelecom PJSC (subject to sanctions by Canada, the United States, and Australia) is a state-controlled Russian telecommunications giant that serves as the executor of key state projects in the field of communications infrastructure. RT LABS JSC performs work for the state on projects related to the provision of public services in electronic form and the digitization of the electoral process, which has ultimately facilitated state control over voting outcomes. The company also acts as the general contractor for the development of the Unified Military Registration Registry — a database of all potential conscripts in the country, integrated with mechanisms for monitoring their movements and instruments of state coercion. In the context of the war, this project holds strategic importance for the state, simplifying not only conscription but also military draft, while significantly hindering any attempts by conscripts to evade it. Within the framework of state policy aimed at establishing control over the Russian information space, RT LABS JSC ensures the integration of secure cloud solutions with domestic cryptographic protection tools, thereby promoting data localization and reducing dependence on foreign technologies. The organization participates in state procurements totaling 191 million USD and is a large company with a staff of nearly 1,500 employees, revenue of 141 million USD (2024), and net profit of 18 million USD (2024). RT LABS JSC has historically been closely linked to key figures responsible for state policy in the sphere of internet control. The organization was previously headed by Maksut Shadaev, now Russia's Minister of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media. The operations of RT LABS JSC are directed toward creating a resilient, state-controlled digital ecosystem in which user identification, the collection, storage, and analysis of information enable control over citizens' actions and the persecution of dissenters.

№	Person / Company	Description
22	**Alania Tengiz Mamukovich** Алания Тенгиз Мамукович 21 April 1985 Male	CEO of RT LABS JSC — a subsidiary and key contractor of Rostelecom PJSC, which plays a significant role in creating a resilient, state-controlled digital ecosystem in which user identification and information monitoring ensure state sovereignty over the Russian internet segment and over all user actions. The company serves as the general contractor for the state-commissioned development of the Unified Military Registration Registry. In the context of the war in Ukraine, this registry will enable Russian authorities to effectively carry out military conscription to sustain the aggression and will substantially impede citizens' attempts to evade the draft.
23	**Data Processing and Automation Center JSC** Акционерное общество «Данные — центр обработки и автоматизации» (АО «ДЦОА») TIN: 7743282541 Entity	The company was established to implement the measures stipulated by the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1]. Data Processing and Automation Center JSC is engaged in the deployment of internet traffic filtering systems. The company serves as a systems integrator, combining disparate computer systems into a unified whole. According to a journalistic investigation, in 2020 the company became a supplier of traffic filtering technical equipment intended for use by the General Radio Frequency Center — a state-owned company subordinate to Roskomnadzor [2]. The contract provides for the supply, installation, and subsequent operation of technical equipment designated as technical equipment for countering threats (TSPU). The contract value for 2020 (the first stage of system creation and equipment supply) amounted to 56.5 million USD (based on the exchange rate at the time this list was published). For the period 2022–2024, nearly 325 million USD (based on the exchange rate at the time this list was published) were allocated. Throughout this period, the company carried out the required work, and following the completion of TSPU deployment, it is regarded as the most likely contractor for its modernization.
24	**Kireev Alexey Alexandrovich** Киреев Алексей Александрович 2 March 1968 Male	CEO of Data Processing and Automation Center JSC. The company was established to deploy technical equipment for filtering internet traffic, which plays a key role in enabling the state to restrict Russian citizens' access to uncensored information. Alexey Kireev simultaneously serves as CEO of Gradient JSC (a subsidiary of Rostelecom PJSC), which controls two major players in the internet censorship market — Data Processing and Automation Center JSC and RDP.RU LLC.
25	**RDP.RU LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «РДП.РУ» (ООО «РДП.РУ») TIN: 7729670341 Entity	The company is the primary supplier of technical equipment for filtering internet traffic under the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1]. The main product of RDP.RU LLC is the EcoFilter hardware-software complex — a filtering system. It consists of the software component EcoDPIOS-DU, developed in-house by the company, and Yadro Vegman N110 servers produced by the Yadro Group of Companies. The technical equipment supplied by the company is an essential prerequisite for Russian authorities to control internet traffic, enabling them to enforce censorship and restrict users' free access to information not subject to state control.

№	Person / Company	Description
26	**Nikiforov Dmitry Alexandrovich** Никифоров Дмитрий Александрович 2 November 1979 Male	CEO of RDP.RU LLC. This company manufactures and supplies to the state technical equipment for filtering internet traffic, which has enabled the technical capability for censorship and the restriction of users' free access to information not subject to state control, as well as the potential isolation of the Russian internet from the global network.
27	**Gradient JSC** Акционерное общество «Градиент» (АО «Градиент») TIN: 9705228804 Entity	A subsidiary of Rostelecom PJSC that owns key companies engaged in manufacturing technical equipment for filtering internet traffic in accordance with the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1]: RDP.RU LLC and Data Processing and Automation Center JSC. RDP.RU LLC and Data Processing and Automation Center JSC have been key players in this market since its emergence following the adoption of the federal law. Consequently, through the parent company Rostelecom PJSC, the state controls the production and deployment of the technical equipment required for implementing internet censorship, controlling the dissemination of information, and, where necessary, isolating Russian internet users from the global network.
28	**IKS Holding LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «ИКС Холдинг» (ООО «ИКС Холдинг») TIN: 9701124836 Entity Sanctioned by: US	The parent company of the Yadro brand. It heads a group of companies that manufacture hardware for filtering internet traffic, used in the implementation of the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1]. Company employees participated in the pilot project for deploying internet traffic filtering in Russia. IKS Holding LLC has extensive experience cooperating with the state on issues related to control over the Russian internet segment and was one of the primary beneficiaries of the installation of control systems under the Yarovaya law [3]. Due to its involvement in developing the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM), which enables surveillance of citizens on the internet, the company is subject to US sanctions. According to journalistic investigations, the company is linked to Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov. The company leads an extensive holding specialized in providing technical support for internet censorship and Russian state control over the national segment of the global network.

№	Person / Company	Description
29	**Yadro Group of Companies LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Группа компаний Ядро» (ООО «ГК ЯДРО») TIN: 7703399790 Entity Sanctioned by: EU	A holding company within IKS Holding that consolidates assets involved in manufacturing hardware for filtering internet traffic under the Yadro brand. This technical equipment is used in the implementation of the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1]. The company is a major systems integrator that plays a leading role in producing servers intended for internet traffic filtering and in deploying traffic analysis systems (TSPU) capable of throttling foreign platforms. It is a key supplier of deep packet inspection (DPI) equipment that enables the identification and blocking of traffic characteristic of VPNs. According to journalistic investigations, the company is linked to Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov. The company leads an extensive holding group specializing in the technical infrastructure of internet censorship and Russian state control over the national segment of the global network.
30	**Bureau 1440 LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «БЮРО 1440» (ООО «БЮРО 1440») TIN: 7707446530 Entity	A Russian aerospace company specializing in satellite communications and forming part of the structure of IKS Holding LLC. Bureau 1440 LLC is engaged in developing a Russian low-Earth orbit satellite system for high-speed broadband data transmission. This project holds strategic importance in the context of the war in Ukraine, as it enables the provision of stable internet connectivity for Russian military forces on the battlefield, including the unmanned systems they employ. The absence of access for Russian military personnel to services such as Starlink and similar platforms heightens the significance of the project implemented by Bureau 1440 LLC. Accordingly, the company receives subsidies totaling approximately 1,5 billion USD (based on the exchange rate at the time this list was published) through the state corporation Roscosmos and from budgetary funds, in the form of preferential loans for satellite manufacturing, subsidies for rocket launches, and funding for deploying satellites into low Earth orbit.
31	**Shelobkov Alexey Anatolyevich** Шелобков Алексей Анатольевич 22 April 1979 Male	CEO of IKS Holding LLC and Yadro Group of Companies LLC, which manufacture technical equipment for filtering internet traffic — a key element enabling state control over the Russian internet segment. Alexey Shelobkov also serves as General Director of Bureau 1440 LLC, which is engaged in developing a Russian low-Earth orbit satellite system for high-speed broadband data transmission.

№	Person / Company	Description
32	**KNS Group LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «КНС Групп» (ООО «КНС Групп») TIN: 7701411241 Entity Sanctioned by: US	The company is part of the group of companies producing equipment under the Yadro brand. KNS Group LLC manufactures the server component of the EcoFilter hardware-software complex, designed for “filtering negative content” — that is, implementing censorship. This technical equipment is used in the implementation of the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1]. KNS Group LLC is a major manufacturer of hardware-software complexes based on programmable logic integrated circuits, which are essential for fulfilling the requirements of the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet]. The company operates a full-cycle production facility and is capable of manufacturing specialized technical equipment in quantities of thousands of units. This makes KNS Group LLC a key link in the technical infrastructure supporting Russian authorities’ control over the dissemination of information on the internet. The company is subject to US sanctions due to its involvement in developing the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM), which enables the surveillance of citizens on the internet.
33	**Morozov Nikita Lvovich** Морозов Никита Львович 20 May 1968 Male	CEO of KNS Group LLC, which produces the server component of the hardware-software complex used by the Russian authorities to implement censorship on the internet.
34	**Citadel LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «ЦИТАДЕЛЬ» (ООО «ЦИТАДЕЛЬ») TIN: 9701012339 Entity Sanctioned by: US, EU	The parent company of the Citadel group, which develops software for the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) and for traffic storage under the Yarovaya law [3]. The Citadel group is part of IKS Holding LLC, while retaining within it the status of a separate group of companies, alongside Yadro. The operations of Citadel LLC enable the technical capability for internet censorship and Russian state control over the national segment of the global network. Citadel is one of the primary beneficiaries of the installation of control systems under the Yarovaya law. The company played a key role in the early implementation of internet traffic filtering systems in accordance with the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1]. The Citadel holding acquired 49% of Data Processing and Automation Center JSC — a systems integrator of traffic filtering technical equipment. In 2025, following the completion of the project to deploy traffic filtering technical equipment, Data Processing and Automation Center JSC was sold to Gradient JSC.
35	**Fomin Mikhail Mikhailovich** Фомин Михаил Михайлович 22 March 1981 Male Sanctioned by: US, EU	CEO of Citadel LLC. The company develops software for the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) and for traffic storage under the Yarovaya law [3]. The company played a key role in the early implementation of internet traffic filtering systems in accordance with the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1].

№	Person / Company	Description
36	**Positive Technologies JSC** Акционерное общество «Позитив текнолоджис» (АО «Позитив текнолоджис») TIN: 7718668887 Entity Sanctioned by: US	The primary operating company of the Positive Group, directly engaged in the development, implementation, and sale of various tech products and services. The company produces software used for remote management of technical equipment employed to block content deemed undesirable by the state. This software forms part of the Kontinent hardware-software complex manufactured by Security Code LLC. It is a major company with revenue of 322 million USD and net profit of 62 million USD (based on the exchange rate at the time this list was published), employing over one thousand personnel (latest available data is for 2021). The company belongs to a group controlled by the holding company Positive Group PJSC (TIN: 9718077239), which is subject to EU sanctions. The company itself has been under US sanctions since 2021 in connection with its alleged collaboration with Russian intelligence services in malicious attacks against the United States.
37	**Baranov Denis Sergeevich** Баранов Денис Сергеевич 21 May 1985 Male	CEO of Positive Technologies JSC. The company produces software used for remote management of technical equipment employed to block content deemed undesirable by the state. This software forms part of the Kontinent hardware-software complex manufactured by Security Code LLC. Denis Baranov concurrently serves as CEO of Positive Group PJSC (TIN: 9718077239). This holding company controls Positive Technologies JSC and is subject to EU sanctions.
38	**Security Code LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Код безопасности» (ООО «Код безопасности») TIN: 7715719244 Entity Sanctioned by: US	The company manufactures the Kontinent hardware-software complex for remote management of technical equipment used to block content deemed undesirable by the state. The technical equipment produced by Security Code LLC has been certified by the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control and the FSB of Russia, which permits its use in state systems and critical information infrastructure. This makes the offerings of Security Code LLC unique, with the company having no competitors in this field. Consequently, the creation of a hardware-software complex for remote management of technical equipment used to block content deemed undesirable by the state is impossible without the products of Security Code LLC. The company's operations contribute to the enforcement of the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1].
39	**Golov Andrey Viktorovich** Голов Андрей Викторович 16 February 1976 Male	CEO of Security Code LLC, which manufactures the Kontinent hardware-software complex for remote management of technical equipment used to block content deemed undesirable by the state. Certification by the Federal Service for Technical and Export Control and the FSB of Russia renders this technical equipment the sole viable option for use in state systems.

№	Person / Company	Description
40	**NORSI-TRANS CJSC** Закрытое акционерное общество «НОРСИ-ТРАНС» (ЗАО «НОРСИ-ТРАНС») TIN: 7705051215 Entity Sanctioned by: US, EU	The company is one of the market leaders in Systems for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) and technical equipment for implementing the Yarovaya law [3]. SORM enables the surveillance of citizens on the internet and facilitates interaction between communications operators and special services. The company is engaged in developing the core of SORM under the supervision of the FSB. The operations of NORSI-TRANS CJSC enable the technical capability for internet censorship and Russian state control over the national segment of the global network. Due to its involvement in developing the System for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM), NORSI-TRANS CJSC is subject to US sanctions.
41	**Ovchinnikov Sergey Anatolyevich** Овчинников Сергей Анатольевич 5 May 1955 Male Sanctioned by: US, EU	CEO of NORSI-TRANS CJSC. The company supplies Systems for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) and technical equipment for implementing the Yarovaya law [3].
42	**VAS Experts LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «ВАС Экспертс» (ООО «ВАС Экспертс») TIN: 7841476577 Entity Sanctioned by: EU	The company specializes in developing hardware-software complexes for analyzing and managing network traffic in accordance with the Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] [1]. VAS Experts LLC is the developer of SKAT DPI (Traffic Control and Analysis System)—a hardware-software platform that enables internet providers to conduct detailed analysis of traffic passing through their networks, identify the websites, applications, or services to which it relates, and apply various processing rules. SKAT DPI is recognized as one of the most effective solutions for complying with legislative requirements regarding the blocking of prohibited information. Its clients include hundreds of broadband access operators and state institutions. SKAT DPI assists communications operators in fulfilling blocking obligations efficiently and with minimal disruptions. The widespread adoption of such a system by hundreds of providers establishes a centralized mechanism through which the state, via Roskomnadzor [2], can promptly restrict the dissemination of undesirable information, prioritize state services, and enhance overall control over Russia's information space. VAS Experts LLC also manufactures Systems for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM), which enable the surveillance of citizens on the internet and facilitate interaction between communications operators and special services. The company's technical equipment has been deployed at more than 200 communications operators across various regions of Russia and in other countries.

№	Person / Company	Description
43	**Gachko Dmitry Valeryanovich** Гачко Дмитрий Валерьянович 16 August 1976 Male Sanctioned by: EU	CEO of VAS Experts LLC. The company manufactures systems for Operative Investigative Activities (SORM) and technical equipment for filtering internet traffic.

Builders of the “Digital Gulag”

№	Person / Company	Description
44	**MAX LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «МАХ» (ООО «МАХ») TIN: 9714058267 Entity Sanctioned by: EU	The developer and operator of the Russian messenger MAX, which is promoted by state bodies as part of a policy to create a directly state-controlled digital environment for Russian internet users and to minimize the influence of foreign platforms. The messenger is positioned as a key instrument of this policy, integrating communications, public services, and identification mechanisms, thereby enabling centralized monitoring of information flows and ensuring authorities’ access to users’ data and messages. The Russian state encourages the use of MAX through a combination of legislative measures and administrative pressure. MAX is becoming mandatory for interactions with state structures. At the same time, the state requires subordinate organizations to conduct communications exclusively through MAX. Its privacy policy provides for the storage of all data on the territory of Russia and their potential transfer to state bodies. This renders MAX not merely a commercial product but an instrument for implementing the state strategy of digital control. MAX LLC (formerly Communication Platform LLC) is part of the VK conglomerate. The parent company VK (VK IPJSC) is under state control through state structures’ dominance over MF Technologies JSC. The principal shareholders include state-owned Gazprom PJSC through Gazprom-Media Holding JSC, the insurance company Sogaz, controlled by individuals close to Vladimir Putin, and the state corporation Rostec. VK’s management includes Stepan Kovalchuk (grandson of Mikhail Kovalchuk, a close associate of Vladimir Putin) and Vladimir Kiriyenko (son of Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration). Evidence that the purpose of introducing MAX is to control the dissemination of information by Russian users is provided by the state’s policy toward its competitors —popular messengers (WhatsApp, Telegram) owned by international companies. These are subjected to systematic throttling, compelling users to switch to the state-controlled messenger. This is explained by the refusal of these companies to comply with requirements to store user data on Russian territory, which hinders unrestricted access to such data by Russian special services.
45	**Khusnoyarov Farit Faritovich** Хуснояров Фарит Фаритович 23 December 1979 Male	CEO of MAX LLC (formerly Communication Platform LLC). The company is the developer and operator of the Russian messenger MAX, through the deployment of which the state implements its policy of controlling the dissemination of information by creating a fully state-controlled digital environment for users.

№	Person / Company	Description
46	**Ruform LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Руформ» (ООО «Руформ») TIN: 7714886605 Entity	The company manages the Russian video hosting platform RUTUBE (rutube.ru), an analog of YouTube. Within the framework of state policy aimed at establishing control over the information space, RUTUBE's task is to offer Russian users an alternative to YouTube, which refuses to cooperate with Russian authorities on the application of repressive legislation and the removal of content undesirable to state bodies. The state's objective is to create a directly state-controlled digital environment for Russian internet users and to minimize the influence of foreign platforms. Ruform LLC is part of the Gazprom-Media holding, which is controlled by Gazprombank, itself under the control of the state-owned Gazprom. Thus, the RUTUBE service is owned by the state. The operation of alternatives to YouTube, such as RUTUBE, forms part of the state's policy to establish control over the information space through the blocking of foreign platforms. In parallel with blockings or throttling of particularly popular foreign services, Russian authorities seek to provide their Russian users with an alternative in order to minimize public discontent with repressive policies. RUTUBE functions not merely as an analog of YouTube by allowing authorities to block content they find objectionable but also directly serves a propagandistic role, promoting narratives important to the Kremlin and supporting celebrities and influencers loyal to it. Ruform LLC invests significant resources in improving automated censorship methods on its platform to detect content prohibited by repressive legislation. The RUTUBE platform managed by Ruform LLC serves as an important instrument of state propaganda and control over the dissemination of information in Russia.
47	**Ivanov Sergey Yuryevich** Иванов Сергей Юрьевич 24 October 1976 Male	CEO of Ruform LLC. The RUTUBE platform managed by Ruform LLC serves as an important instrument of state propaganda and control over the dissemination of information in Russia.

№	Person / Company	Description
48	**Edinoe Video LLC** Общество с ограниченной ответственностью «Единое видео» (ООО «Единое видео») TIN: 9714058115 Entity	The company manages the Russian video hosting platform VK Video (vkvideo.ru), which serves as a Russian analog of YouTube integrated into the ecosystem of the VK social network. Within the framework of state policy aimed at establishing control over the information space, VK Video's task is to offer Russian users an alternative to YouTube, which refuses to cooperate with Russian authorities on the application of repressive legislation and the removal of content undesirable to state bodies. The state's objective is to create a directly state-controlled digital environment for Russian internet users and to minimize the influence of foreign platforms. Edinoe Video LLC is part of the VK conglomerate. The parent company VK (VK IPJSC) is under state control through state structures' dominance over MF Technologies JSC. The principal shareholders include state-owned Gazprom PJSC through Gazprom-Media Holding JSC, the insurance company Sogaz, controlled by individuals close to Vladimir Putin, and the state corporation Rostec. VK's management includes Stepan Kovalchuk (grandson of Mikhail Kovalchuk, a close associate of Vladimir Putin) and Vladimir Kiriyenko (son of Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration). The operation of alternatives to YouTube, such as VK Video, forms part of the state's policy to establish control over the information space through the blocking of foreign platforms. In parallel with blockings or throttling of particularly popular foreign services, Russian authorities seek to provide their Russian users with an alternative in order to minimize public discontent with repressive policies. Edinoe Video LLC is the primary beneficiary of the YouTube blocking in Russia. VK Video functions not merely as an analog of YouTube by blocking content undesirable to the authorities but also directly serves a propagandistic role, promoting narratives important to the Kremlin and supporting celebrities and influencers loyal to it. The VK Video platform managed by Edinoe Video LLC serves as an important instrument of state propaganda and control over the dissemination of information in Russia.
49	**Maksimovskaya Marianna Alexandrovna** Максимовская Марианна Александровна 7 April 1970 Female	CEO of Edinoe Video LLC. The VK Video platform, managed by Edinoe Video LLC, serves as an important instrument of state propaganda and control over the dissemination of information in Russia. The company is the primary beneficiary of YouTube blocking in Russia.

Links

[1] Federal Law on the Sovereign Russian Internet [Runet] (Federal Law No. 90-FZ of May 1, 2019). This law provides for the creation of mechanisms for centralized network management and the deployment of technical means, including deep packet inspection (DPI) systems, to counter so-called “threats”. These measures established the technical capacity for censorship through traffic control and enabled the potential isolation of the Russian segment from the global internet.

[2] Roskomnadzor (the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology, and Mass Media) is the state agency that serves as the primary administrator of state policy aimed at establishing control over the Russian internet segment. The agency, directly and through its subordinate organization, the Federal State Unitary Enterprise “General Radio Frequency Center,” enforces internet censorship and restricts access to websites and information in accordance with Russia’s repressive legislation.

[3] Yarovaya law (Federal Law No. 374-FZ of July 6, 2016) requires internet companies and telecommunications operators to store users’ communications on Russian territory, enabling the identification and prosecution of individuals who distribute information deemed undesirable by the state.